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ABSTRACT 
 
Many theories of learning and memory (e.g. connectionist, associative, rational, 
exemplar-based) produce  psychological magnitude terms as output (i.e. numbers 
representing the momentary level of some subjective property). Many theories assume 
that these numbers may be translated into choice probabilities via the Ratio Rule, a.k.a. 
the Choice Axiom (Luce, 1959) or the Constant-Ratio Rule (Clarke, 1957). We present 
two categorization experiments employing artificial, visual, prototype-structured stimuli 
constructed from twelve symbols positioned on a grid. The Ratio Rule is shown to be 
incorrect for these experiments, given the assumption that the magnitude terms for each 
category are univariate functions of the number of category-appropriate symbols 
contained in the presented stimulus. A connectionist winner-take-all model of categorical 
decision (Wills & McLaren, 1997) is shown to account for our data given the same 
assumption. The central feature underlying the success of this model is the assumption 
that categorical decisions are based on a Thurstonian choice process (Thurstone, 1927, 
Case V) whose noise distribution is not double exponential in form. 
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Many theories of learning and memory employ what we shall describe as psychological 
magnitude terms. A psychological magnitude term is a continuous number which 
represents the momentary level of some subjective property. For example, a magnitude 
term could represent the subjective level of evidence for the belief that a stimulus is a 
member of a particular category.  
 
Theories which employ psychological magnitude terms include connectionist and 
associative models, many exemplar-based theories, and some normative models. Any 
connectionist model that relies on the activation of output representations to predict 
responding is employing magnitude terms (e.g. Gluck & Bower, 1988a; Kruschke, 1992; 
McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985; Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989). Similarly, the end 
product of many associative learning models is a number (e.g. the sum of associative 
strengths of cues present on a trial) which represents a prediction about level of 
responding (see e.g. Pearce, 1987; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 1981). Further, 
many theories which posit the storage of specific examples or instances are magnitude-
based. For example, models which calculate summed similarity to stored instances in 
order to predict responding are magnitude-based, with the summed similarity scores being 
the magnitude terms (e.g. Estes, 1994; Kruschke, 1992; Lamberts, in press; Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986). Finally some normative models, for example 
Anderson’s rational model (Anderson, 1991), employ magnitude terms. 
 
All models whose output is a set of magnitude terms must specify how these numbers 
translate into empirically testable predictions. In this paper we focus on a particular aspect 
of this decision mechanism issue, namely how are predictions about the probability of a 
specific response derived when multiple responses are possible? An answer common to 
otherwise disparate memory models is that one should invoke the Ratio Rule. The Ratio 
Rule has been proposed by a number of authors (e.g. Bradley, 1954; Clarke, 1957; Luce, 
1959) and goes under a variety of names, including the Choice Axiom (Luce, 1959) and 
the Constant-Ratio Rule (Clarke, 1957). For our current purposes, the Ratio Rule may be 
expressed, 
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where P(i) is the probability of choosing alternative i from n alternatives and vj  is the 
magnitude term for the jth alternative. Theories which employ the Ratio Rule include 
McClelland & Rumelhart’s model of word perception (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981 
Equation 7), their distributed memory model (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985 p. 174-
175), Gluck & Bower’s model of category learning (Gluck & Bower, 1988 Equation 3), 
Kruschke’s ALCOVE  (1992, Equation 3) and ADIT (1996, Equation 10) models, and the 
Generalized Context Model (Nosofsky, 1986, Equation 5). In some cases, the magnitude 
terms employed are transforms of the model’s output, the most common transform being  
 
v = e
ko
 ,           2 
 
where o is the model’s output and k is a scaling constant. Equation 1 implies that 
magnitude terms are non-negative because negative terms would lead to probabilities of 
less than zero. Amongst the advantages of the exponential transform of Equation 2 is that 
it ensures magnitude terms are non-negative. 
 
Whilst the Ratio Rule is commonly used to derive probability predictions from 
magnitude-based models, theorists are seldom explicit about their reasons for choosing 
this particular decision mechanism.  Research designed specifically to test the Ratio Rule 
provides some support for it, but this support is by no means definitive. For example, 
Bradley (1954) and Hopkins (1954) tested the Ratio Rule in the context of pair-
comparison experiments. In a pair-comparison experiment there are  n stimuli. For each 
possible pair of stimuli, subjects are asked to choose one stimulus on the basis of some 
criterion (e.g. pick the sweeter of two flavours). These studies show that response 
probabilities in a number of pair-comparison experiments are explicable in terms of the 
Ratio Rule. The nature of the support provided by both studies is a demonstration that 
RATIO RULE - 6 
there are a set of magnitude terms (one for each stimulus) which, when substituted into 
the Ratio Rule, produce predictions which do not differ significantly from the observed 
data. 
 
There are at least three problems with taking these studies as good evidence in support of 
the Ratio Rule. First, no alternative theory is tested so there may be other formulations 
that would work equally well for these data (e.g. the Difference Rule previously 
investigated by Jones, Wills, & McLaren, 1998). Second, the pair-comparison 
experiments examined typically involve only a few stimuli, and hence there are almost as 
many free parameters as there are data points. For example, in one typical test there were 
four different stimuli, and hence four free parameters. There are six possible pair 
comparisons of four stimuli, and hence only six response probabilities to be predicted. It 
would perhaps be surprising if the Ratio Rule did not pass a goodness-of-fit test under 
such circumstances. The third problem is that support for the Rule is based on a null 
result. Given that the sample size in all tests is small, the results may be due to a lack of 
power in the statistical test rather than the adequacy of the Ratio Rule. 
 
Another area of research designed to test the Ratio Rule concentrates on its prediction 
that the ratio of any two choice probabilities is constant, irrespective of the total number 
of alternatives. This property of the Ratio Rule allows it to predict full-set choice 
probabilities from sub-set choice probabilities, and vice versa. For example, in an 
experiment by Clarke (1957) the full-set decision was to determine which syllable had 
just been presented in noise, given six alternative syllables to choose from. The sub-set 
decisions involved determining the syllables presented given just three of the original six 
alternatives. The full-set choice probabilities were used to derive predictions, via the 
Ratio Rule, for the sub-set choice probabilities. These predictions were then compared 
with the observed choice probabilities. Clarke concluded that the level of agreement 
between predictions and observations was good, with 95% of predictions deviating by 
less than 0.1 from the observed data. A number of other studies have come to similar 
conclusions for a variety of stimuli (e.g. Pollack & Decker, 1960). The problem in 
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accepting such studies as good evidence in support of the Ratio Rule is that, as in the 
analysis of pair-comparison experiments, no alternative theory is considered. 
 
One alternative to the Ratio Rule is to assume that people always choose the alternative 
with the largest subjective magnitude term. This may seem unlikely because the 
probability of choosing an alternative in a specific situation seems constrained to be one 
(if its magnitude term is the largest), or zero (if it is not). However, if subjective 
magnitude terms are subject to random variation across different occurrences of the same 
stimulus then probabilities other than one and zero can be predicted.  
 
If the magnitude terms are assumed to have a Gaussian distribution then this alternative 
theory corresponds to Thurstone’s (1927) theory of judgement, with our term 
psychological magnitude basically corresponding to Thurstone’s term discriminal 
process. As has been noted  previously (e.g. Luce, 1959, p. 56) the Ratio Rule and 
Thurstone’s theory can often make very similar predictions However, Yellot  (1977) 
proved for situations involving three or more choices that the predictions of Thurstone’s 
theory and the Ratio Rule can be equivalent if and only if the distributions employed in 
Thurstone’s theory are double exponential. For a two-choice situation there are 
distributions other than the double exponential which allow equivalence (e.g. an 
exponential distribution). Yellot’s demonstrations were for Case V of Thurstone’s theory, 
which assumes that all distributions have the same variance. 
 
Burke and Zinnes (1965) examined data from three different pair-comparison 
experiments and concluded that Thurstone’s theory (Case V) predicted response 
probabilities somewhat better than the Ratio Rule. In contrast, Hohle (1966) concluded 
from his examination of a different set of pair-comparison data that the Ratio Rule was 
superior. Both papers rely on the quantitative difference between observed and predicted 
response probabilities to discriminate between the two theories - they calculate χ2 
goodness-of-fit for each theory, and favour the theory which generally has the lower χ2. 
Taken together, it is unclear from these papers which theory is to be preferred.  
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In the current paper we report two experiments designed to test some predictions of the 
Ratio Rule for situations other than a straight-forward two-choice task. The predictions of 
the Ratio Rule for these situations are unambiguous and amenable to experimental test. 
However, these predictions are qualitatively different to those made by a model based on 
the principles of Thurstone’s theory. This alternative model is the winner-take-all (WTA) 
connectionist network proposed by Wills & McLaren (1997) and further investigated by 
Jones et al. (1998). Due to the length and complexity of exposition required, details of 
this model and the predictions it makes are presented towards the end of the paper 
 
A prediction of the Ratio Rule 
The prediction of the Ratio Rule under test in our experiments concerns a three-choice 
decision, a two-choice decision and the relationship between the two. In the three-choice 
decision, the subject is presented with stimuli to which three responses (A, B and C) are 
potentially appropriate. The subject must make one of these responses to each stimulus. 
In the two-choice decision the same stimuli are presented but one of the responses (A) is 
disallowed by the experimenter. The subject must make one of the two remaining 
responses. This procedure is an example of the full-set vs. sub-set manipulation described 
above. The prediction under test depends on the assumption that the magnitude terms for 
allowed alternatives are determined by the stimulus itself, and are not affected by whether 
a two-choice or three-choice decision is requested.  
 
The prediction concerns the relationship between two measures. The first measure is the 
probability with which subjects make response A in the three-choice decision. By the 
Ratio Rule as stated in Equation 1, this probability is predicted to be 
  
P(A : A, B,C) =
vA
vA + vB + vC
        3 
 
where vX  is the magnitude term for response x produced by a given stimulus. 
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The second measure concerns the probability of making response B to a given stimulus in 
the two-choice decision and the probability of making response B to an equivalent 
stimulus in the three-choice decision. Specifically, the measure is the difference between 
the two-choice and three-choice probabilities, expressed as a proportion of the three-
choice probability. Formally stated, this measure, which we will refer to as q, is 
 
q =
P(B : B, C) − P(B : A, B, C)
P(B : A, B,C)
       4 
 
Under the Ratio Rule, and assuming type of decision does not affect magnitude terms, q 
is predicted to be 
 
q =
v B
vB + vC
−
vB
v A + vB + vC
v B
vA + v B + vC
       5 
 
which simplifies to  
 
q =
v A
vB + vC
         6 
 
Compare Equations 3 and 6. If  vA
 
 is constant, then any change in q or P(A:A,B,C) must 
be driven by a change in (vB + vC). Further, if vA is constant,  any given change in (vB + vC 
) must produce the same direction of change in q as it does in P(A:A,B,C) [e.g. an 
increase in (vB + vC) must lead to a decrease in q and a decrease in P(A:A,B,C) ]. The 
experiments presented in this paper test this prediction in the context of a category 
learning experiment. 
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A specific prediction about category learning 
Category learning is the task of learning the correct category label for each of a set of 
presented stimuli. It has been the subject of a large number of studies, typically involving 
stimuli which are visual, novel and abstract, and a choice of labels that is limited to a few 
pre-defined alternatives (e.g. Homa, Sterling, & Trepel, 1981; Hull, 1920; Nosofsky, 
1986, Posner & Keele, 1968, amongst many others). Often the stimuli for a given 
category are all distortions of a base pattern, which is sometimes referred to as a 
prototype.  
 
Many theorists have proposed magnitude-based models to account for the data from 
category learning experiments (e.g. Estes, 1994; Gluck & Bower, 1988; Kruschke, 1992; 
McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986), and a great 
many of these models (including all those just cited) employ the Ratio Rule to translate 
magnitude terms into response probability predictions. The widespread use of the Ratio 
Rule in models of category learning suggests that this might be an apposite procedure for 
testing its predictions. 
 
In the current experiments, subjects were presented with labelled examples from each of 
three categories (A, B and C) and were then asked to decide the category membership of 
each of a set of unlabelled transfer examples. This general methodology has been 
employed previously to investigate a variety of issues (e.g. Homa et al., 1981; Posner & 
Keele, 1968). In our experiment, half the subjects were asked to decide whether each 
transfer stimulus was an A, a B or a C. The other half  were asked, for an equivalent set of 
transfer stimuli, whether each stimulus was a B or a C. 
 
The stimuli employed were composed of a fixed number of distinct features. All transfer 
stimuli contained four category A features, and a varying number of category B and C 
features. Number of category C features was constrained by the equation 
 
xC
  
= 8 - xB          7 
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where xC
 
 is the number of category C features, and xB is the number of category B 
features. 
 
Subjects responses to these transfer stimuli were used to estimate generalization 
functions. The generalization functions considered were the probability of making a 
particular response to a stimulus as a function of its similarity to a particular category 
prototype. Our index of similarity to a category prototype was the number of features 
from that prototype the stimulus contained. 
 
The specific generalization functions considered were P(A:A,B,C), P(B:A,B,C) and 
P(B:B,C), as a function of similarity to the category C prototype. The value of q as a 
function of similarity to category C can be calculated from the P(B:A,B,C) and P(B:B,C) 
functions. Hence, the experiment was designed to provide an assay of how P(A:A,B,C) 
and q change as a function of similarity to prototype C (on our similarity index of number 
of prototype C features). What one can conclude from these empirical functions depends 
on how the manipulation of number of A, B and C features translates in to changes in the 
magnitude terms for responses A, B and C. The crucial assumption we make is that the 
magnitude terms for a response are a univariate function of the number of corresponding 
features in a stimulus. In other words, we assume that the mean magnitude term for 
response y is solely determinable from the number of category y features in the presented 
stimulus.  
 
Under this assumption, our experiment is a test of the prediction of the Ratio Rule 
derived in the previous section. The term vA will be a constant because number of 
category A features is constant. Therefore, any change in the observed values of 
P(A:A,B,C) and q as a function of number of category C features must be caused by 
changes in (vB + vC). Further, a given change in number of category C features must result 
in the same change in (vB + vC) for the q function as for the P(A:A,B,C) function because 
the same stimuli are being considered in both cases. The Ratio Rule therefore predicts 
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that the observed q  and P(A:A,B,C) functions will show the same direction of change 
over any interval of our “number of category C features” index. If our assumption of 
univariate magnitude functions holds, the accuracy with which this index represents 
psychological similarity as assessed by, for example, multi-dimensional scaling of 
identification responses (see e.g. Shepard, 1957), is not important.  
 
Further specific tests 
In the current experiments, subjects get an equal amount of training on each of the three 
categories, and the method of stimulus construction is identical for each category. Hence 
it might be reasonable to assume that each category response has the same univariate 
magnitude function. In other words, that the mean value for the magnitude term for 
response y is the same for a stimulus containing x category-appropriate elements, 
irrespective of whether y is A, B, or C. If one makes this assumption for responses B and 
C then further predictions can be derived from the Ratio Rule. First, q and P(A:A,B,C) 
must be symmetrical around xB = xC due to the relation between xB and xC given in 
Equation 7. Second, the shape of the q and P(A:A,B,C) functions is determined by the 
shape of the magnitude function.  
 
Previous categorization experiments have shown that the Ratio Rule can be rejected if 
magnitude is assumed to be a linear function of our similarity index, but not if it is 
assumed to be an exponential function (Jones et al., 1998). These experiments employed 
similar procedures and stimuli to our current experiments. If magnitude terms in the 
current experiments are an exponential (or any monotonically accelerating) function of 
our index then q and P(A:A,B,C) will be at a maximum where xB = xC. Where xB = xC, the 
magnitude terms for categories B and C will be equal. Any departure from xB = xC will 
lead to an increase in one x term and a corresponding decrease in the other, due to the 
relationship given in Equation 7. This will result in an increase in one magnitude term 
and a decrease in the other. However, as the function is accelerating, the increase in 
magnitude produced by a given change in x will be greater than the decrease in magnitude 
produced by that change (Figure 1a may make this clearer, the thinner line is an 
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accelerating function). This results in an increase in (vB + vC ), and hence a decrease in q 
and P(A:A,B,C), for any departure from xB = xC. This prediction is illustrated in Figure 
1b.  
 
- Figure 1 about here - 
 
Of course, the magnitude function may be neither linear, nor monotonically  accelerating. 
We consider one further class of magnitude functions in this paper -monotonically 
decelerating functions. If the magnitude terms for different categories are identical and of 
this form then q and P(A:A,B,C) will be at a minimum where xB = xC. As for accelerating 
decay functions, any departure from xB = xC will lead to an increase in one x term and a 
corresponding decrease in the other. However, because the function is decelerating, the 
decrease outweighs the increase (see Figure 1, thicker line), leading to a reduction in (vB 
+ vC ), and hence a increase in q and P(A:A,B,C). This prediction is illustrated in Figure 
1c.  
 
EXPERIMENT ONE 
 
To summarise, our first experiment had two phases. In the training phase, subjects 
learned about the category membership of training stimuli. Each training stimulus 
belonged to one of three categories - A, B or C. In the generalization phase which 
followed, subjects were asked to determine the category membership of a different, 
transfer, stimulus set. Half of the subjects were allowed to respond A, B or C. For the 
other half of subjects the response A was disallowed. In each group, the responses to 
transfer stimuli were used to derive generalization probability functions (the probability 
of making a specific response to a stimulus as a function of the difference between that 
stimulus and the appropriate category prototype). 
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The central prediction of the Ratio Rule applied to any magnitude-based model of 
categorization is that our measures P(A:A,B,C) and q derived from these generalization 
probability functions will show the same direction of change over any given section of the 
generalization function. This prediction is based on the assumption that the magnitude-
based model of categorization produces magnitude terms for each category which are 
univariate functions of the number of category-appropriate features the presented stimulus 
contains. Subsidiary predictions about the shape of the q and P(A:A,B,C) generalization 
functions, illustrated in Figure 1, can be derived by making further assumptions about the 
nature of the magnitude functions. 
 
Method 
Subjects and Apparatus 
The subjects were 24 adults, mainly Cambridge University undergraduate students. The 
experiment was run (by S.R. and N.S.) on two Acorn Risc PC computers in different, 
quiet cubicles. The computers were connected to 14" colour  monitors (Acorn AKF 60) 
which were placed at eye level and about 80 cm in front of subjects. Responses were 
recorded via the  “X”, “B” and “M” keys of a standard PC  keyboard. For the purposes of 
this experiment, the keys were re-labelled “A”, “B” and “C” using bold red letters against 
a white background. This resulted in three response keys near the centre of the bottom 
row of the keyboard, separated from each other by one key and ordered ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ from 
left to right. 
 
- Figure 2 about here - 
Stimuli 
Each stimulus was a collection of twelve different small pictures (hereafter elements) in a 
4.5cm by 3.5cm rectangle outline, arranged on an invisible four-by-three grid (see Figure 
2 for an example). Every stimulus contained twelve elements drawn from the pool of 
thirty-six that we have used in previous experiments ( see Jones et al., 1998, p. 37; Wills 
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& McLaren, 1997, p. 611). At the beginning of the experiment, and separately for each 
subject, 12 elements from the pool were randomly designated as category A elements, a 
different 12 as category B elements and the remaining 12 as category C elements. Each 
training stimulus for each category was constructed by starting with all 12 elements 
characteristic of that category (e.g. category A elements for a category A training 
stimulus). Each element in the training stimulus then underwent a 10% chance of being 
replaced by a randomly chosen element from one of the other two sets (e.g. replaced by a 
B or  C element in the case of a category A training stimulus). It was these modified 
stimuli which were presented to subjects as training stimuli. This procedure produces 
training examples which are composed predominately of elements characteristic of a 
particular category but which also exhibit considerable variability in terms of the specific 
elements they contain.  Ninety training stimuli were created for each subject, thirty from 
each of the three categories. 
 
Each test stimulus contained four A elements, x B elements and (8-x) C elements, where x 
could be 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8. Ten examples of each of these nine types of test 
stimulus were created for each subject. The specific elements used to create each test 
stimulus were chosen randomly within the constraints provided by the number of A, B 
and C elements the stimulus was to contain. Ten examples of each of four dummy stimuli 
were also created, these stimuli being (8 A, 0 B, 4 C), (8 A, 4 B, 0 C), (0 A, 4 B, 8 C) and 
(0 A, 8 B, 4 C). The purpose of the dummy stimuli was to obscure from the subjects that 
all test stimuli of interest (from the perspective of the experimenters) were constant in 
terms of the number of elements from category A they contained.  
 
The position of elements within a stimulus was randomly determined for each stimulus 
presented, with the constraint that exactly one element occurred at each location in the 
four-by-three grid. Where stimuli were accompanied by a category label, this was 
presented as a large sans-serif capital A, B or C in an outline rectangle (4.5 by 3.5 cm) 
immediately  to the right of the stimulus itself 
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Procedure 
Subjects were allocated to one of two between-subject groups such that an equal number 
(12) participated in each. The two groups, referred to hereafter as the two-choice and 
three-choice groups, differed only in the question they were asked in the test phase.  
 
After subjects had read some general instructions, the ninety training stimuli were 
presented to them sequentially and in a random order. Each example was presented for 
five seconds in the centre of the monitor, accompanied by the appropriate category label. 
Two seconds of a plain mid-grey mask in the stimulus and label rectangles  preceded the 
next example.  Subjects were not required to respond in any way in this first phase of the 
experiment. They were simply asked to concentrate on the examples shown as they would 
later be asked to classify new, unlabelled examples. This training procedure has proved 
effective for stimuli of this type in a number of previous experiments (Jones et al., 1998; 
Wills & McLaren, 1997). 
 
The training phase was followed by a test phase. There were 130 stimuli in the test phase 
(90 target stimuli and 40 dummy stimuli) which, again, were presented sequentially and 
in a random order. Test stimuli were not accompanied by a category label. Subjects in the 
two-choice condition were asked, for each stimulus, “Is this a B or a C?”. Subjects in the 
three-choice condition were asked   
“Is this an A, a B, or a C?”. In both conditions, subjects responded by pressing the 
appropriate key on the computer keyboard. Subjects then pressed the “Y” key, whereupon 
the next stimulus was immediately presented. There was no time limit for these decisions, 
and subjects were put under no pressure to respond quickly. 
 
Results 
The probabilities with which subjects responded “B” and “C” to the test stimuli allow a 
test of our subsidiary assumption that the magnitude functions for categories B and C are 
the same. If they are then the empirical generalization functions of the two categories 
should be the same. That is to say, the probability of responding “B” to a stimulus with x 
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B elements should be the same as the probability of responding “C” to a stimulus with the 
x C elements. 
 
To assess whether this assumption could be disconfirmed with the current data set, type 
of probability assessment [ P(B) or P(C) ] was included as a within-subjects factor in a 
mixed-design analysis of variance. The other two factors in this analysis were 1) the 
number of category-appropriate elements in a stimulus (i.e. B elements for P(B) and C 
elements for P(C), 9 levels, within-subject) and 2) experimental condition (two-choice vs. 
three-choice, 2 levels, between-subjects). Type of probability assessment was non-
significant as a main effect, F(1, 22) <  1, p > 0.5, and did not interact significantly with 
any other factor, p > 0.05 in all cases. However, this analysis did reveal that the type of 
question asked (two-choice or three-choice) had a significant effect on responding, 
F(1,22) = 88, p < 0.0005, as did the number of category-appropriate elements in a 
stimulus, F(8, 176) = 48, p < .05 after a conservative correction for non-sphericity 
(Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959). The interaction between number of category-appropriate 
elements and experimental condition was non-significant, F(8, 176) = 2.1, p = 0.13 after a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction ( ˆ ε = 0.27). 
 
As the two probability assessments did not differ significantly, their average was 
employed in all subsequent analyses. Figure 3a shows these means plotted as a function 
of number of category-appropriate elements for both the two-choice and the three-choice 
conditions
1
. Values for the q statistic (as stated in Equation 4) were then calculated from 
each pair of points. Specifically, for each value of category-appropriate elements, the 
mean three-choice probability was subtracted from the mean two-choice probability and 
the resulting number divided by the mean three-choice probability. The resultant values 
of q are plotted as a function of category-appropriate elements in Figure 3b. Also plotted 
in Figure 3b is the mean probability of choosing category A in the three-choice condition 
as a function of category-appropriate elements. This is the P(A:A,B,C) function referred to 
in the introduction. Category B elements were used as the category-appropriate elements 
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when plotting this function. Using category C elements instead would simply reverse the 
function left to right. 
 
The central prediction of the Ratio Rule under test is that the q and P(A:A,B,C) functions 
will show the same direction of change over any interval of the category-appropriate 
elements axis. Inspection of Figure 3b suggests that is not the case for our data. To 
investigate this further, we attempted to characterise the two functions by polynomial 
regression. Inspection of the P(A:A,B,C) function suggests that it exhibits a shallow 
inverted-U trend. Second-order polynomial regression of the nine data points of the mean 
P(A:A,B,C) function produced the best-fit line illustrated by the solid curve in Figure 3b. 
The equation of the line is P(A) = -0.003c
2
 + 0.021c + 0.29, where c is the number of 
category-appropriate elements. A corresponding regression of the q function produced the 
best-fit line q = 0.02c
2
 - 0.19c + 0.86, where c is the number of category-appropriate 
elements. This equation suggests a U-shaped trend in the q statistic, opposite to the trend 
in P(A:A,B,C) and hence contrary to the predictions of the Ratio Rule.  
 
- Figure 3 about here - 
 
The preceding analysis is inconclusive, however, as neither equation represents a 
signficant fit to the data, F(2,6) = 1.6, p > 0.25, for the P(A:A,B,C) function and F(2, 6) = 
1.3, p > 0.3, for the q function. Further inspection of the q statistic suggests that there may 
be a cubic component in the data. This issue is returned to in the Discussion. 
 
Given that the generalization functions of categories B and C are not significantly 
different to each other in the current data set, a further analysis of the q and P(A:A,B,C) 
functions is possible. Recall that the Ratio Rule predicts that if the magnitude functions 
for categories B and C are the same then the both functions should be symmetrical about 
the point xB = xC (which is the point 4 category-appropriate elements). Whilst inspection 
of Figure 3b suggests that the q function is not symmetrical about this point, one might 
argue that its deviation from symmetry is due to sampling error. On the basis of this 
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argument, one might average the pairs of data points at 0 & 8, 1 & 7, 2 & 6 and 3 & 5 
category-appropriate elements on the grounds that these points were equivalent and hence 
taking the average should reduce sampling error. These pairs of points can be considered 
to have a “distance” from 4 category-appropriate elements of 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
The single data point at 4 category-appropriate elements provides the zero distance point. 
 
Figure 3c shows q and P(A:A,B,C) as a function of distance from the 4 category-
appropriate elements point. Second-order polynomial regression revealed that the q 
statistic was best-fit by the function q = 0.04d
2
 -0.11d + 0.37, where d is the value on the 
ordinate of Figure 3c. This function, shown as a dotted line in Figure 3c, was a significant 
fit to the data, F(2, 2) = 116, p < 0.01, and all three of its terms were significantly 
different from zero, t(3) = 9.8, p < .005 for the d
2
 term, t(3) = 6.1, p < .001 for the d term, 
and t(3) = 31, p < .0005 for the intercept. A corresponding regression performed on the 
P(A:A,B,C) data produced a best-fit line P(A:A,B,C) = -0.03d2 + 0.08d + 0.30. This 
function, shown as a solid line in Figure 3c, suggests a downward trend but did not 
significantly fit the data, F(2, 2) = 2.9, p > 0.25. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment One are somewhat at odds with the predictions of magnitude-
based models of categorization that employ the Ratio Rule. Assuming magnitude is a 
univariate function of our category-appropriate elements index, the Ratio Rule predicts 
that the q and P(A:A,B,C) functions should show the same direction of change over any 
interval of that index. 
 
The indications from Figure 3b are that this prediction is not upheld in Experiment One. 
However, the failure of both the q and the P(A:A,B,C) functions to significantly fit a 
quadratic makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions. Quadratic functions were chosen 
because this is basically the form predicted by both monotonically accelerating and 
monotonically decelerating magnitude functions. One avenue of analysis would have 
been to attempt to fit higher-order functions to the data, such as a cubic function to the q 
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statistic. We did, in fact, investigate some such functions, but the results of a replication 
of this experiment in Experiment Two (reported below) subsequently led us to believe 
that the cubic component of the q statistic was not reliable. Hence, these analyses are not 
presented in this paper. 
 
Some conclusions can be drawn from the current experiment under the additional 
assumption that the magnitude functions for categories B and C are the same. No 
evidence against this assumption was found in the direct test provided by the ANOVA 
reported above. Under this additional assumption, both the q and P(A:A,B,C) functions 
should be symmetrical about the point 4 B elements. The fact that the observed q function 
is clearly not symmetrical about this point is potentially a problem for the Ratio Rule. 
Such a problem might be dismissed as sampling error by arguing that the function is 
symmetrical and deviations from symmetry are due to the relatively small sample size. 
However, if such an appeal is valid, then it must be permissible to average data points at 
corresponding distances from the mid-point of 4 category-appropriate elements. The 
prediction of the Ratio Rule remains that the q and P(A:A,B,C) functions should show the 
same direction of change over any interval of the abscissa in Figure 3c. 
 
Inspection of this figure strongly suggests that this prediction is not upheld. However, the 
failure of the P(A:A,B,C) function to fit any quadratic function whilst the q function fits 
an increasing function, allows the possibility that both functions are, in fact, increasing 
but that the trend in P(A:A,B,C) is too shallow to be detected reliably. This interpretation 
of the results would be consistent with the application of the Ratio Rule to a magnitude-
based model producing monotonically decelerating magnitude functions. However, the 
results of Experiment One are contrary to the predictions of the Ratio Rule when applied 
to a model producing linear or monotonically accelerating (e.g. exponential) magnitude 
functions. If the magnitude functions produced were monotonically accelerating then an 
inverted-U trend in both q and P(A:A,B,C) would be predicted by the Ratio Rule, and 
hence both functions in Figure 3c would be predicted to show a decreasing trend. If the 
magnitude functions produced were linear then both functions in Figure 3c would be 
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predicted to be horizontal. The significant increasing trend in the q function is contrary to 
both these predictions. Hence, for models producing linear or monotonically accelerating 
magnitude functions, the Ratio Rule is an inappropriate theory of the decision process in 
categorization (within the assumptions made). 
 
We felt that the results of Experiment One were sufficiently anomalous, from the 
perspective of the Ratio Rule theory, to merit replication. This was one of the purposes of 
Experiment Two. 
 
EXPERIMENT TWO 
 
One problem with the design of Experiment One was that category labels were not 
counter-balanced; it was always category “A” which had the constant number of elements 
at test, and which was the disallowed option in the two-choice condition. If our subjects 
had a consistent response bias towards one of the category labels then this might have led 
to a distortion of response probabilities in a way outside of the scope of the Ratio Rule as 
considered here. Experiment Two controls for this by replicating Experiment One, but 
employing equal numbers of subjects with A, B, and C as the category contributing a 
constant four elements in test stimuli and the category disallowed in the two-choice 
condition. For brevity, we shall refer to the category which provides a constant number of 
elements in test stimuli as category a, and the two categories providing variable numbers 
of elements as categories b  and c. 
 
Experiment Two extends Experiment One by the addition of a third between-subjects 
condition. Subjects in this condition received the same training stimuli and test question 
as subjects in the three-choice condition. However, in this new condition the test stimuli 
contained no elements from category a. Instead, the four category a elements were 
replaced with four elements unseen in the training phase. This manipulation was designed 
to substantially reduce the probability with which subjects responded that test stimuli 
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came from category a, without actually disallowing this response option. The addition of 
this novel-elements condition allows the computation of two further functions. The first 
function we describe as P(a:a,b,c)’, which is the probability of choosing category a  in the 
novel-elements condition. The second function is q’, calculated as q but replacing 
P(b:a,b,c), the mean probability from the two-choice condition with P(b:a,b,c)’, the mean 
probability from the novel-elements condition. 
 
These two new functions, along with the q  function, and the P(a:a,b,c) function from the 
three-choice condition, give a total of four functions to be assessed in Experiment Two. 
Our assumption was that our novel-elements manipulation would produce a constant, 
possibly zero, magnitude term for category a at test (hereafter referred to as v6 ). Under 
this assumption, the Ratio Rule predicts that all four functions must show the same 
direction of change over any interval of our category-appropriate elements measure. The 
derivation of this prediction has already been demonstrated for q and P(a:a,b,c). Its 
extension to the other two functions is straight-forward. Predictions for the P(a:a,b,c)’ 
function can be derived from Equation 3, simply by substituting v6 for vA
 
. The Ratio 
Rule’s predictions for the q’ function are  
 
q' =
P(b : a,b,c)' −P(b : a,b,c)
P(b : a,b,c)
=
vB
v6 + vB + vC
−
vB
vA + vB + vC
vB
vA + vB + vC
   8 
 
 
which simplifies to 
 
q' =
vA − v6
vB + vC + v6
         9 
 
Note that for both q’ and P(a:a,b,c)’ variability in the function is determined by the term 
(vB + vC) in the denominator, all other terms being constant. The same conditions hold for 
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the q and P(a:a,b,c) functions. Hence, the Ratio Rule predicts that all four functions will 
show the same direction of change over any interval of category-appropriate elements. 
 
Method 
Subjects and Apparatus 
The subjects were 36 higher-education students from the Cambridge area, most were 
Cambridge undergraduate or graduate students. The experiment was run (by MS) on an 
Acorn Risc PC computer placed in one of two quiet experimental cubicles. The computer 
was connected to a 14” colour monitor (Acorn AKF 60), placed at eye-level and 
approximately 90 cm in front of the subjects. Responses were recorded via a PC keyboard 
marked-up in the manner described in Experiment One. 
 
Stimuli 
The pool of elements from which stimuli were constructed was extended from thirty-six 
to forty elements (the four extra elements used are shown on the bottom row of Figure 2). 
The pool was extended so that once twelve elements had been randomly allocated to each 
of the three categories there would be four unallocated elements. These four elements 
were designated as the novel elements, and were selected independently for each subject. 
The novel elements were not used in the two-choice or three-choice condition. In the 
novel-elements condition, the four novel elements did not appear in training stimuli, but 
did appear in every test stimulus, along with x elements from category b and (8-x) 
elements from category c, where x took the values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8. In other 
words, the test stimuli in the novel-element condition were constructed in the same 
manner as the test stimuli in the other two conditions, except that the four randomly 
selected elements from category a were replaced by the four novel elements. In all other 
respects, the method of stimulus construction was identical to that employed in 
Experiment One. As with all other elements, the position of the novel elements within a 
stimulus was determined randomly for each stimulus. 
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Procedure 
The subjects were allocated to one of three conditions such that an equal number (12) 
participated in each. These conditions were the two-choice and three-choice conditions of 
Experiment One, plus a new novel-elements condition. The novel elements condition 
differed from the three-choice condition only in the stimuli presented in the test phase 
(see Stimuli section). In all other respects, the procedure employed in the current 
experiment was identical to the procedure of Experiment One, with the exception that, in 
the current experiment, allocation of category labels to categories was varied across 
subjects by splitting the subjects in each condition into three equal-sized sub-groups. The 
allocation of labels to categories in these sub-groups is shown in Table 1. 
 
Results 
Figure 4a shows the probability with which subjects in the three-choice and novel-
elements conditions responded with the category a label to test stimuli as a function of 
the number of category b elements they contained. The choice of category b rather than 
category c elements on the abscissa was arbitrary. For category b there are equal numbers 
of subjects who receive “A”, “B” and “C” as its label. The same holds for category c, and 
hence response bias is controlled for whichever is chosen. Number of category c elements 
equals eight minus the number of category b elements, and so choosing category c 
elements as the abscissa would simply reverse both functions left to right. 
 
Inspection of Figure 4a suggests that both the P(a:a,b,c) function from the three-choice 
condition, and the P(a:a,b,c)’ function from the novel-elements condition show an 
inverted-U shaped trend. To investigate this, second-order polynomial regression was 
performed on the nine mean data points of each function. The data from the three-choice 
condition was found to have the best-fit line P(a:a,b,c) = -0.006b
2
 + 0.037b + 0.291 (the 
dotted line in Figure 4a) where b is the number of category b elements.  This function was 
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a significantly good fit to the data, F(2,6) = 5.6, p < 0.05. The b
2
 co-efficient was 
significantly different from zero, t(7) = 2.4, p < 0.05, as was the constant, t(7) = 8.0, p < 
0.0005. The b co-efficient was not significantly different from zero, t(7) = 1.7, p > 0.1. 
These analyses confirm that the P(a:a,b,c) function has an inverted-U trend. The best-
fitting quadratic for the P(a:a,b,c)’ function (from the novel-elements condition) was 
P(a:a,b,c)’ = -0.003b
2
 + 0.016b + 0.112, shown as a solid line in Figure 4a. This best-fit 
line also shows an inverted-U trend, but the function was not a significant fit to the data, 
F(2,6) = 3.2, p > 0.1.  
 
- Figure 4 about here - 
 
The data points plotted in Figure 4b are the average of the probability with which subjects 
responded with their category b label to test stimuli with x category b elements and the 
probability with which they responded with their category c label to test stimuli with x 
category c elements. In other words, like Figure 3a from Experiment One, it shows 
response probability as a function of number of category-appropriate elements. Averaging 
these two probabilities is appropriate because, across subjects, there is no factor which 
determines which of the two categories providing variable numbers of elements to test 
stimuli should be described as category b and which as category c. 
 
For our current purposes it is not the data presented in Figure 4b which is of central 
interest, but the q and q’ functions calculated from the mean data points it displays. These 
functions are shown in Figure 4c. The q function was calculated in exactly the same way 
as it was calculated in Experiment One. In other words, for each value of category-
appropriate elements, the mean three-choice probability was subtracted from the mean 
two-choice probability and the resulting number divided by the three-choice probability. 
For q’ , the calculation was to subtract the three-choice probability from the novel-
elements probability and divide the resulting number by the three-choice probability. 
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Inspection of Figure 4c suggests that the q statistic shows an increasing trend whilst the q’ 
statistic shows a decreasing trend. In order to specify these two functions more clearly, 
each set of nine data points were used to perform a second-order polynomial regression. 
The best-fit line for the q function was q = 0.049c
2
 -0.674c +2.48, whilst for the q’ 
function it was q’ = -0.021c
2
 +0.244c -0.368, where c is the number of category-
appropriate elements. The best-fit line for the q  function is shown as a dotted line in 
Figure 4c, whilst the best-fit line for the q’ function is shown as a solid line. Both 
functions were a significant fit to the data, F(2,6) = 803, p < 0.0005 for the q function and 
F(2,6) = 17, p <  0.005 for the q’ function. The c
2
 co-efficients for both functions were 
significantly different from zero, t(7) = 14, p < 0.005, for the q function and t(7) = 3.0, p 
< .05 for the q’ function. The c co-efficients were also significantly different from zero 
for both functions, t(7) = 24, p < 0.0005, for the q function and t(7) = 4.3, p < 0.004 for 
the q’ function. Finally, both constants were significantly different from zero, t(7) = 2.5, p 
< 0.0005, for the q  function, and t(7) = 3.8, p < 0.01 for the q’ function. 
  
Discussion 
The results of Experiment Two directly contradict the predictions of the Ratio Rule acting 
on the output of a magnitude-based model of categorization, within the assumption that 
magnitude is a univariate function of category-appropriate elements. 
 
Under this assumption, our results pose two central problems for the Ratio Rule. First, the 
Ratio Rule predicts that the q and q’ statistics should show the same direction of change 
over any interval of category-appropriate elements. However, the best-fitting quadratics 
for these functions show opposite directions of change. Second, the Ratio Rule predicts 
that the q function and P(a:a,b,c) function for the three-choice condition should also 
show the same direction of change over any interval of category-appropriate elements. 
Irrespective of whether one chooses to plot P(a:a,b,c) as a function of category b 
elements or as a function of category c elements, the fact that the best-fitting quadratics 
for the q and P(a:a,b,c) functions are of opposite shape (U vs. inverted-U shape) is 
contrary to the predictions of the Ratio Rule. One argument against this conclusion might 
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be that P(a:a,b,c) is an increasing, decelerating function rather than an inverted-U 
function. As q is an increasing, accelerating function, both functions show the same 
direction of change and so the predictions of the Ratio Rule are upheld for these data. 
However, closer study of Equations 3 and 6 reveals that both functions must be 
accelerating or decelerating over any given interval. Variability in both functions is 
determined by changes in the term (vB + vC). If the rate at which this term changes is 
increasing over a given interval then both q and P(a:a,b,c) must show an increasing rate 
of change over that interval. 
 
Experiment Two also substantially replicates the results of Experiment One. In both 
experiments the best-fitting quadratic for the P(a:a,b,c) function shows an inverted-U 
trend whilst the best-fitting quadratic for the q function shows a U-shaped trend. Any 
cubic trend in the q statistic is not replicated in the current experiment. 
 
MODELLING 
 
Wills & McLaren (1997) proposed a winner-take-all connectionist model as an alternative 
to the Ratio Rule in magnitude-based models of categorization. The work presented in 
this section demonstrates that our winner-take-all (WTA) model, unlike the Ratio Rule, 
can account for the results presented in this paper under the assumption of univariate 
magnitude functions. 
 
- Figure 5 about here - 
 
The WTA system is illustrated in Figure 5. The magnitude terms for each category are 
passed to separate units in the network as input activations. The input activations are 
constrained to be no greater than one and no less than zero. The output activity of each 
unit in the WTA system is a function of the total input it receives. In addition to the 
magnitude-term inputs, each unit in the WTA system has a fixed excitatory connection to 
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itself and fixed inhibitory connections to other units. These connections cause the units to 
“compete” with one another until only one has a non-zero activation. In our system, a 
decision is assumed to be reached when the activation of one unit exceeds that of its 
nearest competitor by some threshold value. The category whose unit has the highest 
activity is chosen at that point. Network systems based on the concepts of mutual 
inhibition and self-excitation have been proposed previously by, amongst others, 
Grossberg (1976), McClelland (1979), Page (in press) and Rumelhart & Zipser (1986). 
They have also been previously employed as models of specific experimental paradigms, 
such as serial recall (Houghton, 1990) and simple binary-choice reaction time studies 
(Usher & McClelland, 1995). 
 
The input activations to our WTA system are assumed to be noisy. In other words, whilst 
the magnitude term represents the mean level of input activity, the momentary level of 
input varies randomly about this mean. This means that, whilst the category with the 
highest magnitude term is most likely to be chosen, all other categories have a finite 
chance of being chosen. Further, it means that the WTA model can be considered as a 
connectionist implementation of the basic principles of Thurstonian choice (see 
introduction).  
 
Detailed specification of the WTA system 
Prior to the presentation of a stimulus, the output activation of all units is assumed to start 
from zero. Once the magnitude terms have been presented to the WTA system, the output 
activation of each unit is updated repeatedly until a decision has been reached. The output 
activation of unit i in the WTA system on update c  is determined by 
 
oi,c =
oi ,c−1 + Eni,c
1 + Eni ,c + D
         10 
 
if ni,c > 0 and 
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oi,c =
oi ,c−1 + Eni,c
1 − Eni ,c + D
         11 
 
otherwise, where ni,c is the total input to unit i on update c and E and D are constants 
representing the rate of excitation and decay of activation within the unit. Equations 8 and 
9 can be described as time-averaging, squashing functions. They are squashing functions 
because whatever the absolute magnitude of the input to a unit, its activity is constrained 
by these functions to fall between +1 and -1. The equations are time-averaging because 
the inclusion of the unit’s activity on the previous update in the calculation of its current 
activation means activation represents, not the instantaneous input to a unit, but an 
average of the inputs it has received in the recent past. A more detailed discussion of the 
behaviour of activation functions of this general form is provided by Grossberg (1976).  
 
The total input to a unit i on update c is given by 
 
ni ,c = ri,c + oi ,c−1 − o j ,c−1
j ≠i
∑         12 
 
The term ri,c in this equation is the value of the noisy input produced by the magnitude 
term vi  and presented to unit i on update c. In the simulations which follow, the noise 
added to vi ranges from +6 to -6, has a mean of zero, and has a rectangular distribution 
(i.e. all values from +6 to -6 are equally likely). Superimposed on this noise function is 
the constraint that  ri,c cannot  exceed one or fall below zero. The remaining terms of 
Equation 12 state that each unit receives a positive input equal to its own activation on 
the last update, and a negative input equal to the sum of the activations of the other units. 
It is these terms which specify the self-excitatory and mutually inhibitory properties of the 
WTA system. 
 
The final component of the WTA system is the decision threshold. The decision threshold 
is the amount by which the unit with the highest activation has to exceed the activation of 
RATIO RULE - 30 
its nearest competitor in order to “win” and cause the production of its associated 
response. This value is the S parameter of the WTA model. In the current simulation, S is 
set to 0.18 for the two-choice condition, 0.65 for three-choice condition and 0.72 for the 
novel-elements condition. Employing a different value of S for each condition is in line 
with previous applications of the model where we have assumed that both the type of 
decision (two-choice vs. three-choice here), and the presence of novel elements in test 
stimuli, affects the value of S (Wills, 1998; Wills & McLaren, 1997). The use of a higher 
value for S in conditions where some elements of the test stimuli are novel represents a 
hypothesis that subjects trade-off speed for accuracy when asked to make decisions about 
stimuli that are unfamiliar. 
 
The remaining parameters, E, D and 6, are set to 0.2, 0.1 and 1.1 respectively. These 
values are the same as those employed by Wills & McLaren  (1997) in the simulation of 
their experiments, and by Wills (1998) in the simulation of the experiments presented in 
Jones et al. (1998). 
 
Specification of magnitude terms 
In order to simulate the results of Experiment Two, magnitude terms for each category at 
each value of category-appropriate elements are required. We will assume for the 
purposes of this simulation that these magnitude terms are linear functions of number of 
category-appropriate elements. Each category is assumed to have the same magnitude 
function which, in the current simulations, takes the form  
 
vi = 0.047ci + 0.012          13 
 
where ci  is the number of category i elements the stimulus contains.  
 
In previous applications of the WTA model, we have employed a single-layer, elemental, 
error-correcting network to specify the magnitude terms. This model was employed 
because it captured something of the effects of varying the number of training examples 
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presented. In the current experiments, because number of training examples does not vary 
between conditions, the performance of this network model is  characterised by a single 
linear function. Equation 13 specifies this function for the network model presented in 
Wills & McLaren (1997) when the model’s learning-rate parameter is set to 0.0025. This 
value is of the same order of magnitude as learning rates we have employed previously in 
simulating experiments of this sort. 
 
Simulation 
The simulation we present is of Experiment Two. Experiment One is not simulated 
because its two conditions are repeated in Experiment Two, and because possible 
response bias is not controlled for in Experiment One. 
 
The simulation involved presenting, in turn, every combination of magnitude terms that 
would be produced by the application of Equation 13 to the set of test stimuli employed 
in the experiment. Each combination was presented 50,000 times, and the decision made 
by the WTA system recorded each time. The probability with which each response was 
made to each type of test stimulus was then calculated from this record. This was done 
separately for each of the three experimental conditions. 
 
In the two-choice condition of our experiment, subjects were not allowed to make 
category a responses. In our WTA model this was simulated by fixing the output 
activation of the category a unit (oa ) at zero. The output activations of the category b and 
c units were allowed to take the values determined by Equations 10, 11 and 12. The 
assumption made in doing this is that only allowed responses compete for the right to 
produce a response. In the three-choice condition and in the novel elements condition, all 
three output activations were allowed to vary. In the novel-elements condition, vA was 
assumed to be zero
2
. However, the noise component of the magnitude term means that oa 
will not always be equal to zero, and hence category a will be chosen with a non-zero 
probability. 
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The response probabilities predicted by the WTA model are presented (as lines) in 
Figures 6a-c, along with the mean probabilities observed in Experiment Two (as 
unconnected plot symbols). It can be seen from this figure that the WTA model, unlike 
the Ratio Rule, can predict the correct shape for the q, q’, P(a:a,b,c) and P(a:a,b,c)’  
functions. Further, the data and predictions correspond fairly closely, although it may be 
noted that the values predicted for q and P(a:a,b,c)’ are slightly lower than those 
observed. Nevertheless, our simulation demonstrates that the WTA model is capable of 
predicting the major trends observed in our experiment. We have already determined that 
(within certain assumptions) the Ratio Rule is unable to do so. 
 
- Figure 6 about here - 
Discussion and further simulation 
The WTA model is a relatively complex system with four free parameters (E, D, 6 and s). 
The Ratio Rule, in contrast, has no free parameters - its predictions are entirely 
determined by the magnitude terms it is presented with. This contrast in complexity raises 
two related questions. First, is it simply increased complexity and, in particular, the 
presence of more parameters, that permits the WTA model to successfully account for our 
data? Second, which components of this complex model are central to producing its 
predictions, and which are unnecessary for predicting the current data set? 
 
Despite its complex statement, a simple theoretical principle lies at the heart of the WTA 
model. The principle is that one always chooses the allowed alternative with the largest 
magnitude term. If the alternative with the largest magnitude term is not chosen, this is 
because magnitude terms are noisy and the alternative chosen appeared to have the largest 
magnitude term over the finite time allowed for decision. 
 
The most basic instantiation of the central “pick the biggest” principle underlying the 
WTA model would be to take the instantaneous value of each of the noisy magnitude 
terms and pick the alternative with the largest value at that instant. The probability with 
which this simple-WTA system picks each alternative is entirely determined by the means 
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and distributions of the magnitude terms. Like the Ratio Rule, the simple-WTA system 
has no free parameters, although more information about the magnitude terms is required 
to derive predictions from the simple-WTA system. 
 
We have calculated the predictions of the simple-WTA system assuming magnitude terms 
with a rectangular distribution with a width of 0.7 and means determined by Equation 13. 
The correspondence between predictions and data is by no means as good for this 
simplified model as it is for the full model (see Figures 6d-f). However, it can be seen 
that the simple model can correctly predict the basic trends observed in the q, P(a:a,b,c) 
and P(a:a,b,c)’ functions. The q function is predicted to show an increasing trend, whilst 
the P(a:a,b,c) and P(a:a,b,c)’ functions are predicted to show an inverted-U shaped trend. 
Employing Gaussian distributions with a standard deviation of 0.28 (which have a 
rectangular equivalent with a width of 0.7) produces comparable results. 
 
The fact that the simple-WTA model can  predict the q function to be different in shape to 
the P(a:a,b,c) and P(a:a,b,c)’ functions is encouraging. It means that the success of the 
WTA class of models in predicting these functions where the Ratio Rule failed to do so is 
not simply due to the greater complexity of WTA models or the greater number of 
parameters employed. It also suggests that it is the central “pick the biggest from noisy 
alternatives” principle which underlies the success of the full WTA model, rather than the 
specific way this principle is instantiated. 
 
However, the presented simulation of the simple-WTA model does not correctly predict 
the trend in the q’ statistic. We cannot state definitively that the simple-WTA model is 
unable to predict this trend, but we believe that it is the adoption of different decision 
thresholds for the three-choice and novel-elements conditions in the full model that 
allows it to correctly predict the q’ data. Were S to take the same value in both conditions, 
the probability of choosing, say, the category b response for a stimulus with x category b 
elements would always be greater in the novel-elements condition than in the three-choice 
condition (and hence q’ would always be positive). This is because there is less 
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competition from the category a alternative in the novel-elements condition (due to the 
stimuli in that condition containing no category a elements). Increases in the value of S 
reduce the chance of choosing an alternative that does not have the highest magnitude 
term. Hence increasing the value of S in the novel-elements condition has the effect of 
reducing the response probabilities in the region three category-appropriate elements 
down to zero category-appropriate elements. At zero category-appropriate elements, the 
effect is sufficiently great to make the predicted probability of response in the novel-
elements condition lower than the predicted probability for the three-choice condition, 
causing q’ to be negative and producing a downward trend in the q’ statistic. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Any theory of learning and memory whose output is a set of magnitude terms must 
specify how these terms translate into testable predictions. Where those predictions 
concern response probabilities, it is commonly assumed that the Ratio Rule provides the 
appropriate translation. With certain qualifications, this assumption has been shown to be 
incorrect for the categorization experiments presented in this paper. 
 
If any one step of a chain of inferences is incorrect then the conclusions drawn from that 
process must be brought into question. Consequently, theoretical conclusions about the 
nature of learning and memory which have been drawn from models which employ the 
Ratio Rule must be re-examined if our conclusion is valid. Conversely, if the assumptions 
we have made in coming to our conclusions can be shown to be invalid then the Ratio 
Rule is not necessarily incorrect. Below we consider some possible arguments against our 
conclusions. 
 
One general class of argument arises from the fact we have estimated the shape of our 
four functions (q, q’, P(a:a,b,c), P(a:a,b,c)’ ) from mean data rather than from the data of 
individual subjects. On this basis, one could argue that whilst we have demonstrated the 
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Ratio Rule to be incorrect for average responses, it may actually be correct for 
individuals. If this were shown to be true it would not substantially change our conclusion 
that the Ratio Rule is incorrect as most models of memory have been predominately 
applied to mean rather than individual data.  
 
Another variant of the general argument against using mean data would be that the 
assessment of functions provided is not reliable or is substantially inferior to that 
provided by multivariate methods. Whilst the q statistic appears to have a cubic 
component in Experiment One but not in Experiment Two, the presence of the same basic 
trends in these two experiments provides substantial evidence against the position that 
our assessment method is unreliable. Further, in a between-subjects design, the adoption 
of multivariate methods for the q statistic would be inappropriate because the function is 
calculated from decisions made by different people. This problem could be addressed by 
the adoption of a within-subjects design. The central problem with this approach would 
be that if any subject made exclusively category a responses at any value of category-
appropriate elements in the three-choice decision, then the value of q calculated from 
their data would be undefined (because P(b:a,b,c) would be estimated as zero, and any 
number divided by zero is undefined). There seems to be no satisfactory way of 
addressing this problem if it occurred - excluding subjects because one’s dependent 
measure cannot represent their behaviour is not really appropriate, and replacing the 
undefined values with some real number would be difficult to do in a manner which was 
both non-arbitrary and relatively atheoretical. 
 
A reasonable criticism of our experiments would be to point out that the stimuli 
employed are rather more complex than those typically used in category learning 
experiments. It may therefore be argued that the results we have found with our complex 
stimuli do not generalise to more simple stimuli, such as simple outline drawings or basic 
geometric forms. If this were shown to be true, the use of the Ratio Rule to describe 
categorical decisions about simple stimuli might be valid. If one accepts that the objects 
we have to categorize are often complex, a theory of categorical decision that can only 
RATIO RULE - 36 
explain our decisions about stimuli which are simple seems to be of limited use. 
However, the question of whether our results generalise to simple stimuli is clearly an 
empirical one and worthy of investigation. 
 
A different line of argument against our conclusion that the Ratio Rule is incorrect would 
be to demonstrate that, for specific models of categorization, the resultant magnitude 
terms for our test stimuli were not univariate functions of the number of category-
appropriate elements. For example, magnitude terms in the Generalized Context Model 
(Nosofsky, 1986) are determined by the position of stimuli in a psychological similarity 
space. If one could determine the position of our test stimuli in such a space and 
demonstrate that they were not at a constant distance to the category a prototype then the 
GCM’s use of the Ratio Rule would potentially be appropriate. This conclusion is itself 
subject to two qualifications. First, it would have to be demonstrated that the GCM could 
actually predict our results from the psychological similarity space derived. Second, the 
positions of stimuli in psychological similarity space are determined in GCM by a model 
of identification that assumes the Ratio Rule to be correct. Some way of avoiding the 
circularity involved in trying to test a theory whilst assuming it to be true would have to 
be found. 
 
A more general argument against our conclusions would be to state that magnitude terms 
are affected not only by the stimulus presented but also by the alternatives allowed for the 
decision. If this were true for our experiments then the derivation of the q statistic 
presented in Equations 4, 5 and 6 would be flawed as vB is specifically assumed to not be 
affected in this way. This argument may be seen as a qualification of our conclusions, 
which may thus be stated more fully as “the Ratio Rule is incorrect for models which 
have no process by which information about allowed decision alternatives can affect the 
magnitude terms produced”. This qualification excludes none of the categorization 
models cited in this paper from our conclusions. 
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Interestingly, a number of theorists have proposed ways in which the Ratio Rule as 
originally stated may be developed to allow it to be sensitive to the alternatives allowed 
for decision. For example Restle (1961) suggests that, in a two-alternative decision, both 
magnitude terms should have a value subtracted from them which represents the 
similarity of those two alternatives. Hence, under Restle’s theory, the decision between a 
foreign holiday, and a foreign holiday plus a peanut, is treated as a decision between a 
peanut and nothing because the holiday is received irrespective of one’s choice. Restle 
did not extend his theory to situations involving more than two alternatives and hence it 
cannot be applied the current data. Tversky (1972) proposed a similar theory which is 
applicable to the 6-alternative case, but his theory replaces the single magnitude term per 
alternative required by the Ratio Rule with a set of magnitude terms that represent the 
importance of particular aspects of each alternative. Most models which employ the Ratio 
Rule would require substantial revision in order to allow them to provide the set of 
magnitude terms required. 
 
If one needs to replace the Ratio Rule in its basic form with a much more complex theory 
of decision-making such as Tversky’s in order to explain our data, then  this would 
support our central conclusion that the Ratio Rule, as currently employed, is incorrect. 
However, an alternative approach might be to make some minor modification to the Ratio 
Rule that would allow it to account for our results. Whilst it is impractical to consider 
every possible modification, we will discuss one particular idea which has been proposed 
by a number of researchers (e.g. Aitken, 1996; Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998). 
 
The modification is to add a constant which can be thought of as representing the 
presence of background noise in the decision process. Specifically, the Ratio Rule is 
modified to 
 
P i( )=
v i + X
v j
j =1
n
∑ + nX
         14 
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where X is a constant representing background noise. This modification allows the Ratio 
Rule to account for (amongst other things) the results of Jones et al. (1998) even if linear 
magnitude functions are assumed. However, the addition of a constant will not affect the 
prediction that change in P(a:a,b,c) and change in P(a:a,b,c)’ is determined by change in 
(vB + vC).   Similarly, this modified Ratio Rule results in a prediction for q of,  
 
q =
vA + X
vB + vC + 2X
         13 
 
and for q’ of 
 
q' =
vA − v6
vB + vC + v6 + 3X
        14 
 
The addition of constants will not affect the prediction that change in q and q’ are 
determined by change in (vB + vC). Hence, this modification still predicts that all four 
empirical functions ( q, q’, P(a:a,b,c) and P(a:a,b,c)’ ) will have the same direction of 
change over any given interval of category-appropriate elements, which we have shown is 
not the case. 
 
Our central conclusion is that the Ratio Rule is an inappropriate theory of categorical 
decision and should be replaced by a system based on the principles of Thurstonian 
choice. However, the Ratio Rule and Thurstonian choice need not necessarily be 
considered as different classes of explanation. As discussed earlier, Yellot (1977) 
demonstrated that the predictions of the Ratio Rule are equivalent to a Case V 
Thurstonian choice process with double exponential noise distributions. As such, the 
Ratio Rule may be considered as a description of one member of the set of Thurstonian 
choice processes
3
. If the Ratio Rule is considered in this way then our central conclusion 
is more properly stated as “the Case V double exponential Thurstonian choice process is 
an inappopriate model of categorical decision, but other Thurstonian choice processes are 
potentially appropriate”.  However, one might alternatively consider the Ratio Rule to be 
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a statement that people make probabilistic judgements on the basis of deterministic 
magnitude terms, in contrast to the Thurstonian theory that people make deterministic 
judgements on the basis of probabilistic magnitude terms.  If considered in this manner, 
the Ratio Rule and Thurstonian choice are clearly different classes of explanation. 
 
Finally, it is important to state that the winner-take-all model presented by Wills & 
McLaren (Wills & McLaren, 1997) is just one of a large class of models which produce 
predictions about response probability and response time on the basis of a competitive 
race. Other examples of this class include a number of connectionist models (e.g. 
Houghton, 1990; Lacouture & Marley, 1991; Usher & McClelland, 1995), some instance-
based memory models (e.g. Logan, 1988; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997), and several other 
mathematical models of various descriptions (e.g. Karpiuk, Lacouture, & Marley, 1997; 
Ratcliff, 1978). Page (in press) provides an excellent discussion of the similarities and 
differences between some of the aforementioned theories. By using our WTA model to 
simulate the data presented in this paper we do not intend to imply that it is the only 
model of its class which has the potential to explain our results. Indeed, the partial 
success of our simple WTA model suggests that its is the general principles of 
Thurstonian choice, rather than the competitive race itself, which underly the success of 
our full model. Many models employing these general principles are likely to be able to 
explain many of our results (e.g. Ashby & Townsend, 1986), as long as the noise 
distribution employed does not render their predictions indistinguishable from those of 
the Ratio Rule. 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
 
Figure 1: a) Two theoretical magnitude functions. The thinner line is a 
monotonically accelerating function. For any point on this curve, the change in magnitude 
caused by an increase x in similarity produces a larger change in magnitude (y’) than a 
corresponding decrease in similarity (y). The converse is true for a monotonically 
decelerating function (thicker line). b) Illustration of the Ratio Rule’s predictions if 
categories B and C have the same monotonically accelerating magnitude function. c) 
Illustration of the Ratio Rule’s predictions if categories B and C have the same 
monotonically decelerating function.  
 
Figure 2: An example stimulus. 
 
Figure 3: Results of Experiment One. a) Mean response probability as a function of 
number of category-appropriate elements in the presented test stimulus. The ordinate is 
the mean of the probability of producing a category B response to stimuli containing a 
given number of category B elements and the probability of producing a category C 
response to stimuli containing that number of  category C elements. b) Probability of 
producing a category A response in the three-choice condition, and the q statistic (see 
Equation 4), as a function of number of category-appropriate elements. c) As Figure 3b, 
but plotted as a function of “distance” from the 4 category-appropriate elements point on 
that graph. Figures 3b and 3c show data as unconnected plot symbols; the lines are the 
best-fitting quadratics to the plotted data. Figure 3a shows data as connected plot 
symbols; there are no best-fit lines shown. 
 
Figure 4: Results of Experiment Two. a) Probability of producing a category A 
response in the three-choice and novel-elements conditions as a function of the number of 
category b elements in the presented test stimulus. b) Mean response probability as a 
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function of number of category-appropriate elements in each of the three conditions of 
Experiment Two. The ordinate is the mean of the probability of producing a category B 
response to stimuli containing a given number of category B elements and the probability 
of producing a category C response to stimuli containing that number of  category C 
elements. c) The q and q’ statistics (see text) as a function of number of category-
appropriate elements. Figures 4a and 4c show data as unconnected plot symbols; the lines 
are the best-fitting quadratics to the plotted data. Figure 4b shows data as connected plot 
symbols; there are no best-fit lines shown. 
 
Figure 5: The winner-take-all model. 
 
Figure 6: Simulation of Experiment Two with the full WTA model (Figures 6a-c) 
and the simple-WTA model (Figures 6d-f). The lines show the predictions of the models. 
The observed data of Experiment 2 are re-plotted as unconnected plot symbols in Figures 
6a-6c for comparison. 
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Sub-group Category a Category b Category c 
1 A B C 
2 B C A 
3 C A B 
 
Table 1: Allocation of category labels in the three sub-groups of Experiment Two. 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1
  Note that the abscissa in all these figures is reversed such that category-
appropriate elements reduces from left to right. This is to allow the figures to conform to 
the convention that generalization functions are plotted with negative slopes. 
 
2
  Inspection of Equation 13 might suggest that va should be set to 0.012 rather than 
zero, on the grounds that ca will be equal to zero. However, for the simple network model 
presented in Wills & McLaren (1997),  va will be equal to zero because the novel 
elements are not presented in the training phase and hence no association will form 
between them and the category labels. The predictions presented are not dependent on the 
choice of zero rather than 0.012 for the value of va. 
 
3
 Considering the Ratio Rule in this way assumes that Gaussian distributions are not a 
defining property of Thurstone’s theory. Such an assumption seems reasonable given 
Thurstone argued that “the only valid justification for bringing in the probability curve 
[i.e. the Gaussian distribution] ... is that its presence can be experimentally tested” 
(Thurstone, 1927, p. 373). 
